Lab Leaks, Biological Weapons and the Growing Risk of Future Pandemics

Why a Lab Leak May Be More Likely Than a Deliberate Attack

What I understood was that only a person with a death wish would be crazy enough to deploy or release a biological weapon into a community, knowing full well that the impact could be extraordinary and cause a worldwide pandemic. It is very disturbing because many terrorists fit into that category—but it is still a smaller group.

Now think about all the people in BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories—scientists, nations and academic institutions—who are manipulating pathogens to make them more virulent or transmissible. Biosafety Level 4 is the highest security designation. The discussion cites 3,600 such institutes around the world. I do not know of 3,600 terrorist organizations. Therefore, the chances of an accidental release may be statistically higher. That is why I begin the scenario with a lab leak. Such incidents have happened before.

I can imagine a researcher in a BSL-4 laboratory accidentally sticking a syringe into himself, panicking and then, being human, going home in a state of denial.

Yes, and something similar has happened. There are other examples, including Nikolai Ustinov, whom I wrote about in a short history lesson in the book. He launched a deadly attack. The Marburg virus has no cure, and the Soviet scientist did what he told himself he had to do before ending up isolated behind a locked door on a submarine, dying a gruesome death from hemorrhagic fever. Accidents happen.

Gain-of-Function Research and Pandemic Potential

You and I have both written about the risks of gain-of-function research, including the reconstitution of pandemic influenza strains that could spread among ferrets. You write in your book that the most dangerous research accelerated after 9/11, when someone was sending emails about anthrax.

Yes, I think that is interesting. In the case of anthrax, humans are a “dead-end host.” In other words, inhaling anthrax can kill you, but it is not contagious. Anthrax never became a pandemic. Its purpose was to make people experience fear. But airborne pathogens are completely different.

Fast-forward to where we are now. Whether it involves genetic engineering, gain-of-function research or AI-enabled biotechnology, everything is on the table when it comes to pandemic potential. Pathogens can be adjusted. Scientists in laboratories can work on creating pathogens that evade existing immunity. The mousepox experiment and the H5N1 ferret influenza experiment are examples. We are living in a completely different world now.

The Risks of Scientific Arrogance

When I called the influenza researcher, I was shocked by how arrogant he was. “Of course we have to expose this incredibly deadly sequence of events.” He did not think much about it. There is arrogance among some of these researchers.

There is also the arrogance or elitism of looking down on amateurs because they are not scientists—as if they cannot make decisions about national security or public health. I find that very worrying.

One of the most impactful things about my scenario books, both nuclear and biological, is that subject-matter experts, treaty makers, Vatican cardinals and United Nations diplomats from around the world have told me: “Thank you for making this so understandable.”